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INTRODUCTION
The United States of America has an addiction. The federal, state, and local
governments collectively consumed over seventy billion dollars for its satiation in
2008.1 Comparatively, just three decades ago, in 1982, it demanded less than twenty
billion in expenditures.2 By 2008, it was directly affecting one out of every one hun-
dred adults residing in this nation.3 Incarceration. The United States is addicted to
its correctional facilities, and it boasts the greatest incarceration rate in the world.4
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process. I am very grateful to the members of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal,
particularly Lee Tankle, for their efforts in preparing this Note for publication. And finally,
a special thank you to my family for their unwavering support and encouragement.
1 JOHN SCHMITT, KRIS WARNER & SARIKA GUPTA, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH,
THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 2 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net
/documents/publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf. Based upon data collected by the Bureau
of Justice Statistics, the authors estimate that the United States government expended almost
seventy-five billion dollars in 2008 on corrections. Id. Incarceration measures received the
greatest allotment. Id. State governments spent significantly more dollars on corrections than
did the local and federal levels, with the federal government spending the least. Id. at 10.
2 Id. at 10.
3 Prison Count 2010, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, 1 (Apr. 2010), http://www.pewstates
.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2010/Pew_Prison_Count_2010.pdf [hereinafter Prison Count].
In 2008, one in every one hundred adults was an inmate at either a local jail or state or federal
prison. Id. See also One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES (2008),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedfiles/PCS_Assets/2008/one%20in%20100.pdf [hereinafter
One in 100].
4 See SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. The United States, as of 2008, was imprisoning
753 people for every 100,000. Id. Russia was next in line with 629 inmates for every 100,000
people. Id. at 4–5. When compared to other fiscally strong nations participating in the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United States, in 2009, was at the
forefront of the incarceration movement with a staggering lead. Id. at 3. Poland, ranking sec-
ond in its incarceration rate among countries belonging to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, followed the United States with a meager rate of 224 inmates
for every 100,000 people. Id. Iceland had the lowest rate with just forty-four individuals in
prison or jail for every 100,000 people. Id.
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Most of these inmates are placed in State prisons and jails,5 where the deathly combi-
nation of population overcrowding and a dire lack of resources cultivate an atmosphere
that can inhumanely infringe on inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights.6
The State correctional facilities in California foster particularly heinous environ-
ments. So heinous, in fact, that in 2006, former California Governor Arnold Schwarze-
negger announced that California was in a state of public safety emergency.7 It is no
wonder then, that this state—the frontrunner in correctional system spending8—has
captured negative judicial attention.9 On May 23, 2011, the Supreme Court, in an opin-
ion delivered by Justice Kennedy, held that California’s state prisons were operating at
such overcapacity as to directly inflict cruel and unusual punishment on California in-
mates, an Eighth Amendment violation.10 The Court therefore affirmed a lower court’s
order directing California to reduce its prison overcrowding by a specified percentage
over the next two years.11 The question plaguing the governor, legislators, wardens and
civilians is how to bring the State into compliance with this order.12 Other states—
including Virginia—that fear the imminence of similar judicial mandates of their own
5 Id. at 10 (estimating that 60% of the nation’s incarcerated individuals are held in State
correctional facilities).
6 See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923, 1947 (2011) (“For years the medical
and mental health care provided by California’s prisons has fallen short of minimum constitu-
tional requirements and has failed to meet prisoners’ basic health needs. . . . [O]vercrowding
is the ‘primary cause of the violation of a Federal right,’ specifically the severe and unlawful
mistreatment of prisoners through grossly inadequate provision of medical and mental health
care. . . . The medical and mental health care provided by California’s prisons falls below the
standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment.” (citation omitted) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i)). See generally Terence P. Thornberry & Jack E. Call, Constitutional
Challenges to Prison Overcrowding: The Scientific Evidence of Harmful Effects, 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 313 (1983) (examining—through case outcomes—when injurious prison conditions are
considered by the judiciary to have escalated to the point of being cruel and unusual, with
a specific focus on prison overcrowding).
7 Don Thompson, California Inmate Release: Schwarzenegger Prison Reform Policies
Were Mixed, HUFFINGTON POST (May 24, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/24
/california-inmate-release_n_866189.html?view=print.
8 One in 100, supra note 3, at 11 (“[Thirteen] states now devote more than $1 billion a
year in general funds to their corrections systems. The undisputed leader is California, where
spending totaled $8.8 billion [in 2007].”).
9 See id. (“California vividly symbolizes the financial perils of the state prison business.
On top of the perennial political tug-of-war, the state’s whopping corrections budget is shaped
by a bevy of court settlements that make predicting and controlling spending tricky. Following
successful lawsuits by prisoner plaintiffs, California now is subject to court oversight of in-
mate medical and dental care, mental health services, its juvenile offenders, and the treatment
of disabled inmates. Even its parole revocation system is controlled by a legal settlement, and
thereby subject to judicial orders that influence spending.”).
10 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1918–19, 1947.
11 Id. at 1922–23, 1945–47.
12 See id. at 1943, 1946–47.
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will be carefully observing California over the next two years, to see how America’s
guinea pig in prison reform will tackle its share of this national problem.13 However,
these States would be ill-advised to adopt all of California’s remedial plans in their
current frameworks.
Unfortunately, at least one of California’s current proposals to remedy the Eighth
Amendment violation in its penitentiary system is being executed in a constitution-
ally unacceptable manner and therefore is not, in its present enactment, a sufficient
remedy to a problem fraught with economic, political and societal concerns.14 The
proposal, titled the Alternative Custody Program, clearly runs afoul of the Constitu-
tion’s guarantee of equal protection. This Note examines that initiative, and elucidates
its constitutional flaws. Part I establishes the foundational basis with a discussion of
inmate rights—as they are inherently limited in comparison to the free population’s—
and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as they apply to State prisons. The section
then discusses the conditions in California State prisons, as they have become the na-
tion’s testing ground for prison reform, and focuses on how one particular condition—
prison overcrowding—was judicially deemed an Eighth Amendment violation by the
California federal courts in Coleman v. Wilson,15 Plata v. Schwarzenegger,16 Coleman
13 See Michael Doyle, Supreme Court Orders California to Release Prisoners, STATE
COALITION OF PROB. ORGS., http://www.scopo.org/legislative110523.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2012) (“Eighteen states—including Texas, Alaska and South Carolina—explicitly supported
California’s bid for more leeway in reducing prison overcrowding. These states worry that
they, too, might face court orders to release inmates.”). For a complete listing of, and the argu-
ments made by, the eighteen states, including Virginia, that petitioned the Supreme Court to
favor California and not order a prison reduction, see generally Brief for the States of Louisiana
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (No. 09-1233), 2010
WL 3501185 [hereinafter Brief for the States of Louisiana et al.].
14 Prison overcrowding is positively correlated with an increase in prison costs, which
drain state treasuries. See One in 100, supra note 3, at 11 (“The primary catalyst behind the
increase [in prison cost] is obvious: prison growth means more bodies to feed, clothe, house
and supervise.”). Prison costs have been on the rise for twenty years and, as a result, States
have become financially unable to devote general funds to other social causes, such as trans-
portation, higher education, and Medicaid. Id. at 14–15. For a more detailed analysis of the eco-
nomic impact that prison overcrowding has had on States’ civil programs, see id. at 14–16.
Traditionally, politicians have favored a “tough on crime” platform, which translates into harsher
sentencing and increased use of incarceration. See id. at 17. The economic viability of harsher
sentencing appears to be changing this political framework, but it is still a driving force that
will continue to influence States’ approaches to incarceration policies and prison reform. See
id. at 17, 21. It is not surprising that this general political stance reflects society’s traditional
preference for incarceration, driven by its concern for public safety, desire for retribution, and
position on morality—i.e., that criminals are bad people who should be locked away from the
general public. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998–1000 (1991) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (discussing the role of the legislature in establishing the principles of the penal
system and how at different times, the goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation have been weighed differently).
15 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
16 No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005).
306 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:303
v. Schwarzenegger,17 and by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Plata.18
Part II conducts an overview of California’s response to the overcrowding problem,
and its much touted initiative, Public Safety Realignment of 2011 (“Realignment”).
One of California’s current proposals, which falls under the umbrella of Realignment,
is the Alternative Custody Program.19 The program is intended to remedy the Eighth
Amendment violation, but it is constitutionally problematic in its own right. Indeed,
it treads on the Fourteenth Amendment. Part III unfurls the program’s constitutional
shortcomings, specifically in the context of equal protection, and Part IV offers a rec-
ommendation for bringing the Alternative Custody Program into conformity with
the Constitution.
I. PROTECTION OF INMATE RIGHTS
Prisoners are not afforded all of the constitutional rights that they enjoyed prior
to incarceration.20 Limiting or suspending constitutional protections otherwise avail-
able to the free population is acceptable in the prison context as long as the restric-
tions “bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests.”21 Those rights that
17 No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2010 WL 99000 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010).
18 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
19 Specifically, the Alternative Custody Program places female inmates who are the pri-
mary caretakers of children in their households in a correction program outside of a prison
or jail. See infra Part III. Other initiatives include releasing those inmates with the worst med-
ical conditions, transferring State prison inmates to other state-run or privately contracted
prisons, and placing new and future offenders in county prisons instead of State prisons. See
infra Part II. Only the female release program will be addressed in detail by this Note.
20 See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (upholding a state prison regulation
that limits inmates’ rights to freedom of association); Ortiz v. Fort Dodge Corr. Facility, 368
F.3d 1024 (8th Cir. 2004) (upholding a prison policy that prohibited an inmate from writing
a letter in Spanish to his family, despite the inmate’s contention that the regulation violated
the First Amendment); Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding a prison
regulation that required male inmates to be housed in single occupancy cells on the basis of
their homosexual orientation, despite inmate allegations that the segregation was an equal
protection violation).
21 Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 132. In Bazzetta, the plaintiffs, a group composed partly of Michigan
state prisoners, alleged that the Michigan Department of Corrections violated their First, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it employed additional restrictions on the types of
visitors that inmates could receive on non-contact visits. Id. at 128–31. The Supreme Court
acknowledged the importance of “accord[ing] substantial deference to the professional judg-
ment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate
goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish
them.” Id. at 132. See also Matthews v. Wiley, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (D. Colo. 2010). In Wiley,
the inmate plaintiff argued that his transfer to another correctional facility violated his Fifth
Amendment right to procedural due process. Id. at 1167. The court held that there was a “legiti-
mate penological interest” that would be furthered by transferring the plaintiff to the different
facility. Id. at 1171. The plaintiff consistently engaged in violence during his incarceration
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would run contrary to “proper incarceration” will not be upheld.22 Legitimate in-
terests may include prison guard and inmate safety, the well-being of visitors, proper
conservation of prison resources, and correctional facility security,23 as well as pris-
oner rehabilitation.24 Rights such as freedom of association25 and freedom of speech,26
and activities ranging from outdoor recreation27 to social commentary28 and physical
expression29 therefore have been duly limited.
However, as noted by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Plata, “the law and the
Constitution demand recognition of certain other rights.”30 Therefore, while States
and had escaped from prison. Id. The legitimate interests of safety and security, therefore,
warranted his placement in a more secure environment. See id. at 1171–74.
22 Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 131.
23 See id. at 133–35 (finding legitimate prison interests to include internal security, reducing
the risk of crime, protecting minors from inappropriate inmate behavior, minimizing the oppor-
tunity for drug and alcohol circulation, preservation of facility resources, and general safety);
Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that a restriction on the length of
inmate facial hair was not a violation of freedom of expression under the First Amendment
because the restriction facilitated inmate identification, hampered inmates’ abilities to con-
ceal prohibited items on their persons, would make it more difficult for inmates to speedily
alter their physique during an escape, and therefore furthered the legitimate prison interests
of security and safety); Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that a pro-
hibition on fantasy role playing was not an unconstitutional violation of freedom of speech
under the First Amendment because the role playing promoted antagonistic behavior and
gang activity that risked prison security, the sustainment of which is a legitimate penological
interest); Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988) (deciding that it was not an Eighth
Amendment violation for a prison to place stricter parameters on the nature and mode of
physical exercise and recreation for capital inmates when the purpose is to reduce the risk
of such inmates collaborating in plans, staging escapes, and collecting hostages—activities
that would compromise prison security, a legitimate prison interest).
24 See Koutnik v. Brown, 456 F.3d 777, 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he facility had a
substantial interest in rehabilitating [plaintiff inmate]. . . . There is no question that the reha-
bilitation of inmates is a legitimate interest of penal institutions.”).
25 See, e.g., Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (holding that it was not a First Amendment violation
for a prison to place restrictions on the types of people that can visit inmates).
26 See, e.g., Singer, 593 F.3d at 531; Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding
that it was not a First Amendment violation for a prison to disallow current inmates from
communicating with former inmates).
27 See, e.g., Peterkin, 855 F.2d 1021.
28 See, e.g., Koutnik, 456 F.3d at 785–86 (finding that it was not a First Amendment free-
dom of speech violation to seize inmate plaintiff’s outgoing mail that “attempt[ed] to market
symbols affiliated with racially intolerant groups” because the communications “thwarted
the State’s legitimate goals ‘to encourage the plaintiff to live crime-free when he is released
from custody’ and to foster ‘the ability to resolve conflicts without resorting to violence, and
to recognize that successful reintegration into society requires respecting the rights of others.’
Accordingly, the confiscation of his outgoing mail . . . ‘further[ed] [the] important . . . govern-
mental interest’ in rehabilitation.” (citations omitted)).
29 See, e.g., Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 74–75 (1st Cir. 2011).
30 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
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can establish their own penological interests and further them through prison policies
and management, States are not granted the unchecked ability to infringe on every pro-
tection embodied in the Constitution.31 In 1987, the Supreme Court established four
criteria against which the judiciary is advised to weigh alleged prison violations.32
A limitation on a prisoner’s constitutional rights may be permissible if the restriction
is “reasonably related to [a] legitimate penological interest[ ].”33 To make this deter-
mination, the Supreme Court counseled lower courts to consider:
(1) whether there is a rational relationship between the regulation and the
legitimate government interest advanced;
(2) whether the inmates have alternative means of exercising the restricted
right;
(3) whether and the extent to which accommodation of the asserted right
will impact prison staff, inmates’ liberty, and the allocation of limited
prison resources; and
(4) whether the contested regulation is an “exaggerated response” to prison
concerns and if there is a “ready alternative” that would accommodate
inmates’ rights.34
In cases in which a prison inmate is alleging a constitutional violation as a result of
a prison ordinance or restriction, the inmate bears the burden of proof with respect
31 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (“Our traditional deference to legisla-
tive policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution ‘does not mandate
adoption of any one penological theory.’” (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring))); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
federal and state criminal systems have accorded different weights at different times to the
penological goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”); Singer, 593
F.3d at 535 (“We note that Wisconsin, like all other states, is permitted to pursue its chosen
penological goals and objectives so long as its actions in doing so remain within the bounds
of the Constitution.”); Peterkin, 855 F.2d at 1032–33 (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated, and we have reiterated, that prison administrators must be afforded wide-ranging def-
erence in adopting and carrying out policies that in their reasonable judgment are necessary
to preserve order, discipline, and security. . . . [A] federal court [is not authorized] to second
guess their decisions nor is it our role to express our agreement or disagreement with their over-
all policies or theories of prison administration, as long as we find no constitutional violation.”
(citations omitted)).
32 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
33 Singer, 593 F.3d at 534.
34 Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91). For examples of cases where courts applied
this test as set forth by the Supreme Court in Turner, see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521,
528–29, 531–33 (2006) (applying the Turner four-factor test to a Pennsylvania prison’s policy
on restricted access to print media); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (applying
the Turner four-factor test to a prison ordinance that regulated the types of visitors inmates
could receive); Kuperman, 645 F.3d at 74–77 (applying the Turner four-factor test to a New
Hampshire state prison’s regulation requiring inmates to trim their facial hair).
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to the reasonableness or legitimacy of that restriction, as measured by these factors
dictated by the Supreme Court.35 As expressed in Ewing v. California,36 courts cus-
tomarily defer to the prison policy makers.37 Judges recognize that there are a mul-
titude of restrictions that could fall within the “bounds of the Constitution,”38 and
that such policies are best determined outside the judiciary.39 Therefore, the inmate’s
burden of proof is not easy to satisfy.40 When an inmate does satisfy this burden,
however, the court will cease its deference and “discharge [its] duty to protect con-
stitutional rights.”41 Such rights afforded to inmates include equal protection,42 the
right to exercise their religious beliefs,43 the right to marry,44 the right to access courts
from within the confines of a prison or jail,45 the right to receive due process,46 and
the right to be protected against cruel and unusual punishment.47 The first and last of
35 See Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 132 (“The burden . . . is not on the State to prove the validity
of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.”); Singer, 593 F.3d at 534.
36 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
37 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 12 (“[T]his Court has a longstanding tradition of deferring to state
legislatures in making and implementing such important [prison] policy decisions.”).
38 Singer, 593 F.3d at 535.
39 See Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 132, 135; Singer, 593 F.3d at 534–36.
40 Singer, 593 F.3d at 534.
41 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405–06 (1974) (“But a policy of judicial restraint
cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising
in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental con-
stitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.”)
overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbot, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989).
42 See, e.g., McCoy v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons, 776 F. Supp. 521, 523 (D. Nev. 1991)
(noting that women offenders should be “treated in parity” with their male counterparts (quot-
ing Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.W. Va. 1981) (internal quotation marks
omitted))); Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Va. 1980); Washington v. Lee, 263
F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (deciding that racial segregation in prisons and jails violated
the Fourteenth Amendment), aff’d, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); see also William Bennett Turner,
Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual For Prisoners’ Rights Litigation, 23 STAN.
L. REV. 473, 490–91 (1971).
43 See, e.g., Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 393 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D. Mass. 2005) (finding
that inmates have a First Amendment right to practice—within reason—their religious principles,
as long as those principles are held in good faith).
44 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that prisoners have a consti-
tutionally protected right to marry other inmates).
45 See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (holding prison measures that prohi-
bited inmates from helping one another with release petitions were unconstitutional because
they thwarted inmates’ protected right to seek habeas corpus).
46 See, e.g., Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (finding that
inmates who are transferred to a higher security prison should receive notice of the reasons
motivating the transfer, as the transfer affects the inmates’ liberty interests, which are pro-
tected by due process).
47 See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)
(using unrestrained physical force on inmates, regardless of whether the inmate sustains seri-
ous injury, can be cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
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these rights—enumerated in the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments, respectively—
are of particular interest here.
A. Protecting the Right to Equal Protection in Prison
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”48 Courts have consistently
recognized prison inmates’ rights to equal protection in a variety of contexts, includ-
ing gender discrimination.49 In Keevan v. Smith,50 female inmates in Missouri com-
plained that the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources violated
the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them “equal access . . . to post-secondary edu-
cational programs and . . . to prison industry employment”51 merely because they were
females.52 Although the court acknowledged that it is natural and expected for dif-
ferent prisons to offer different programs,53 it also noted that a disparity in offerings
cannot be constitutional if it is predicated on a desire to treat “similarly situated” in-
mates differently solely because some are considered to be members of a “protected
class.”54 The court found that in this particular case, the female appellants were not
similarly situated to the male inmates housed in the other institutions and who alleg-
edly received preferential treatment, because they had substantially different security
classifications, population levels, and sentence terms.55 The court, however, did ex-
plain that had the inmates been similar with regard to the aforementioned factors, then
the varying levels of access to the prison programs would run afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment if they had a disproportionately negative impact on female inmates and
were rooted in invidious intent.56
48 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49 See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
50 100 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 1996).
51 Id. at 645.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 651 (“Because no two prisons are the same, it is a virtual certainty that inmates
in one prison will have certain amenities not available to inmates in another.”).
54 Id. at 647–48 (“To establish a gender-based claim under the Equal Protection Clause,
the appellants must, as a threshold matter, demonstrate that they have been treated differently
by a state actor than others who are similarly situated simply because appellants belong to a
particular protected class.”). The question of whether male and female inmates are similarly
situated turns on various factors. See Wiley v. Trapp, No. 03-4133, 2004 WL 2011453, at *2
(D. Kan. Aug. 16, 2004). Typically, courts will compare the number of prisoners housed in
their respective facilities, their security level, the reason for their incarceration, the nature
of their sentence, and any additional, relevant factors arising under the circumstances. Id.
55 Keevan, 100 F.3d at 648–49.
56 Id. at 650–51 (“Even assuming . . . that male and female inmates were similarly sit-
uated for purposes of the Department’s placement of prison industries, an equal protection
review of Department decisions requires further analysis. . . . [A facially] neutral policy
employed by the Department [that] has a disproportionately adverse effect upon women [will
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In Glover v. Johnson,57 female inmates brought a successful equal protection claim
against the Michigan Department of Corrections, alleging that the Department pro-
vided male inmates with “educational and vocational rehabilitation opportunities,”
pay rates, libraries, and work pass programs that were significantly better than those
available to their female counterparts.58 Applying intermediate scrutiny,59 the court
found that the Department was “bound to provide women inmates with treatment
and facilities that are substantially equivalent to those provided the men—i.e., equiv-
alent in substance if not in form—unless their actions, though failing to do so, none-
theless bear a fair and substantial relationship to achievement of . . . correctional
objectives.”60 The district court judge then issued an order directing the Department
to allow female inmates to participate in a post-secondary education program that was
analogous to that which was already offered to male prisoners, and to launch in the
women’s prison a vocational program of the same caliber as the men’s.61
Other courts have held similarly,62 and, as expressed by the United States Dis-
trict Court in the District of Columbia, “[w]here there is a showing that vocational or
educational programs offered to women are different than those offered to men, and
further, that the program offered to women is inferior to that offered to the men, then
a fundamental constitutional question has been raised.”63
B. Upholding the Eighth Amendment in Prison
The scope of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment as it applies in the prison context has been extensively litigated. It encom-
passes undue physical force used on inmates,64 egregious implementation of solitary
be] unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a
discriminatory purpose.” (citation omitted)).
57 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
58 Id. at 1077.
59 Id. at 1078.
60 Id. at 1079.
61 Id. at 1102–03.
62 See, e.g., Canterino v. Barber, 564 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Ky. 1983). In Kentucky, female
prisoners were given unequal access to vocation programs designed to help rehabilitate in-
mates. Id. at 712. Male inmates had comparatively greater access, and the discrepancy was
evidently tied to gender. Id. at 712, 715. Moreover, the programs that were available to female
inmates “demonstrate[d] a very traditional view of women and a desire to train them only for
traditional women’s work. The Supreme Court expressly rejects such a purpose as a justifi-
cation for explicit gender-based classifications.” Id. at 715 (citations omitted).
63 Pitts v. Meese, 684 F. Supp. 303, 313 (D.D.C. 1987). In Pitts, female inmates alleged
that the District violated their guarantee of equal protection by sending women to prisons that
were more geographically isolated than the prisons designated for men. Id. at 304–06. In
addition to making it significantly more difficult to receive visitors, these facilities allegedly
lacked the beneficial programs that were employed in the men’s prisons. Id. at 306.
64 See, e.g., Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010) (holding that in order to conclude that
an inmate suffered unconstitutional physical force, as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment,
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confinement,65 inhumane prison conditions,66 and inadequate access to food,67 shelter,
clothing, and medical care.68
In order for a prisoner to be successful in an Eighth Amendment claim regarding
the circumstances of his incarceration, he “must show that, judged by contemporary
standards of decency, the conditions either ‘involve the wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain,’ that they are ‘grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime,’
or that they entail ‘serious deprivation of basic human needs.’”69 This factual deter-
mination must be coupled with a finding that the prison officials perpetuated the harm
by acting with “deliberate indifference” to the unreasonable impact on inmate safety
and well-being.70 Specifically, “deliberate indifference” arises in a case where the
prison official is knowledgeable of the contested circumstances, and reasons that
those circumstances may result in considerable injury to the inmate, but ignores the
risk in spite of such knowledge.71
a court does not have to find that the inmate sustained substantial physical injury); Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (finding that the use of physical force can constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment even if an inmate does not
suffer substantial injury).
65 Turner, supra note 42, at 492–95.
66 See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (severe prison overcrowding); Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (prison violence); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.
1985) (inadequate physical living space and accommodations for inmates). See generally
Thornberry & Call, supra note 6, at 313, 318 (discussing the unconstitutional results of
prison overcrowding and the factors that may trigger an Eighth Amendment infraction—
inadequacies in lighting, plumbing, cleanliness of eating areas, vermin population, fire pro-
tection, bedding, and protection of inmates).
67 See, e.g., French, 777 F.2d at 1255 (discussing the inferior dietary regimens for inmates).
68 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910; Matthews v. Wiley, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1175 (D. Colo.
2010).
69 Georgacarakos v. Wiley, No. 07-cv-01712-MSK-MEH, 2010 WL 1291833, at *11 (D.
Colo. Mar. 30, 2010) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see also
Matthews, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
70 Matthews, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (“An Eighth Amendment claim includes both an
objective component, whether the deprivation of a basic human need is sufficiently serious,
and a subjective component, whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state
of mind. . . . The ‘deliberate indifference’ subjective standard applies to claims of inhumane
conditions of confinement.” (citations omitted)); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
297 (1991).
71 Matthews, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (“A finding of deliberate indifference requires a
showing that the defendant ‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.’ Under this standard, ‘the official must both be aware of facts from which the in-
ference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837)); see also Farmer,
511 U.S. at 845–46 (noting that a prison official’s indifference to a major threat to prisoner
health and well-being may be evidenced by the official’s refusal to try to decrease the like-
lihood of harm).
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In recent years, with incarceration on a rise,72 prison overcrowding73 has become
a particularly significant cause of constitutionally unacceptable prison conditions and
inadequate access to basic life necessities.74 When a prison operates at overcapacity,
there is a high risk that inmates will not receive proper medical care.75 This lack of
adequate treatment76 is what motivated the Supreme Court in Brown v. Plata to order
California, whose prisons operate at nearly 200% of design capacity, to reduce its ca-
pacity to 137.5%.77 Brown was the culmination of two earlier California cases brought
on behalf of inmates suffering from severe mental and physical health problems.78 In
1995, the Eastern District of California affirmed a magistrate judge’s findings that
State prisoners under the jurisdiction of the California Department of Corrections
were not receiving suitable mental health treatment and that this inadequacy violated
the Eighth Amendment.79 The Department did not have a proper methodology in place
for determining whether inmates suffered from mental illness, there were not enough
prison employees trained to deal with mentally ill inmates, and the prison failed to
monitor the ability of its existing employees to handle the mentally ill.80 Moreover,
not all inmates who required treatment received it, and when they did, it was often un-
timely, not properly recorded, and the medications were improperly administered.81
72 See generally SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 1.
73 For more information on overcrowded state prisons, see generally Prison Overcrowding,
AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/initiatives/prison-overcrowding/ (last
visited Oct. 14, 2012).
74 The Supreme Court addressed the problem of prison overcrowding for the first time
in 1979, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520. In Wolfish, the inmate cells were designed for indi-
vidual occupancy, but, due to substantial increases in population, the cell occupancy was
doubled. Id. at 525–26. See also Thornberry & Call, supra note 6, at 315–16. According to
Thornberry and Call, soon after Wolfish was decided, some courts that were faced with prison
overcrowding paid relatively little attention to the dangers of such overcrowding. Id. at 321.
Over time, the judiciary’s focus shifted to the consequences of prison overcrowding and placed
greater weight on statistical findings and expert testimony. Id. at 321, 327–28. The most re-
cent Supreme Court case on prison overcrowding is Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
75 See generally Thornberry & Call, supra note 6, at 336–51 (discussing how prison over-
crowding increases the rate of inmate physical and mental illness, increases inmate stress and
hypertension, and is positively correlated to inmate death and suicide rates).
76 As of 2009, California prisons were housing twice the optimal number of inmates. See
Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923. Therefore, their medical facilities, if they were operating efficiently,
would be able to serve only half of the inmate population. Indeed, inmates experienced signifi-
cant delays in treatment, with medical wait-lists as long as 700 prisoners. Id. at 1923–25, 1933.
77 Id. at 1923, 1947.
78 Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3,
2005) (addressing inadequate physical health care); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282
(E.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing inadequate mental health care).
79 Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1293, 1296–97, 1324.
80 Id. at 1296–97.
81 Id. at 1297.
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Furthermore, the prison officials were aware of these circumstances, recognized the
risk that they posed to inmate health and safety, and did not endeavor to reduce that
risk.82 These findings collectively led the court to hold that the prison conditions
violated the inmates’ right to be protected from cruel and unusual punishment.83
Accordingly, the Department was ordered to implement, through means decided by
it, a mental health care system that would bring the prison into conformance with
the Eighth Amendment.84
In 2001, the District Court in the Northern District of California found that the
medical health care system in California state prisons was substandard.85 To illus-
trate, the court noted that one inmate dies every week, on average, in a California
prison as a result of inadequate healthcare.86 Unfortunately, the steady incline in the
prison population paralleled a decrease in the utilization of healthcare resources.87
Additionally, the court found that within the prisons, there were organizational im-
pediments, little medical management, incompetency in existing medical staff, and
not enough qualified doctors.88 These problems led to unnecessary deaths and mor-
bidity among inmates.89
The court gave California two years to make improvements in seven prisons,
and then mandated the State to continue improvements at a specified rate until every
prison was brought into compliance.90 As of 2005, however, the problem was per-
sisting to the court’s dissatisfaction, and the litigation continued until 2011,91 when
the Supreme Court addressed the prison healthcare system—as it applies to both men-
tal and physical health—in California.92 Prior to the Supreme Court’s review of this
issue, California was ordered by a three-judge panel, in compliance with the Prison
82 Id. at 1297, 1304.
83 Id. at 1296–98, 1315, 1319, 1323.
84 Id. at 1301–02. The court was not required to:
specify the exact mechanisms for screening inmates, or the number of
staff that must be hired, or the specific level of competence that must
be possessed by staff, or the precise methods of medication manage-
ment to be used, or the manner of maintaining medical records. Indeed,
it would have been error to do so.
Id. at 1302.
85 Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932253, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 2005).
86 Id.
87 Id. at *3.
88 Id. at *3–7.
89 Id. at *7–9. Note that morbidity is interpreted by the court to mean “any significant
injury, harm or medical complication that falls short of death.” Id. at *8.
90 Id. at *2.
91 For a historical synopsis of this line of cases, see Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 560 F.3d
976, 979 (9th Cir. 2009).
92 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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Litigation Reform Act93 (PLRA), to reduce prison overcrowding until the prisons
were operating at no more than 137.5% of design capacity.94 According to the PLRA95
a court may not direct a prison to release inmates unless certain criteria are satisfied.96
First, a court must have already ordered for a “less intrusive” means of relief and that
order must have been unable to bring the prison into constitutional compliance.97
The prison must also have been given a reasonable period of time during which it
could come into compliance.98 If a prison release order is necessary in order to rem-
edy the violation, then it may only be issued by a panel of three judges,99 and such
a panel must first find by clear and convincing evidence that the infraction was
caused by overcrowding and that there is no means, other than a release, by which
the violation can be addressed.100 Here, the three-judge court found that overcrowd-
ing was the principal cause of the insufficient administration of medical services to
California inmates.101 With all of the criteria of the PLRA met, the court issued the
release order, leading California to seek review from the Supreme Court.102 The
Court affirmed the order.103
93 The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006).
94 Id. at 1917. The order, given on August 4, 2009, required that California come into
conformance within two years of the issuance. Three-Judge Panel and California Inmate
Population Reduction, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION (May 23, 2011), http://
www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/2011-05-23-Three-Judge-Panel-Background.pdf. The order trans-
lated to an estimated population decrease of at least 33,000 inmates. Id.
95 The PLRA is Congress’s attempt to limit the number of claims that inmates bring with
respect to prison conditions. See generally Philip White, Jr., Annotation, Construction and
Application of Prison Litigation Reform Act—Supreme Court Cases, 51 A.L.R. FED. 2d 143
(2010) (exploring the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of the PLRA).
96 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (2006).
97 Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i).
98 Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(ii).
99 Id. § 3626(a)(3)(B); see Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922 (2011) (“The authority
to order release of prisoners as a remedy to cure a systematic violation of the Eight Amendment
is a power reserved to a three-judge district court, not a single-judge court.” (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a))).
100 18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(a)(3)(E)(i)–(ii).
101 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1931–37.
102 Specifically, the issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the three-judge
court’s prison reduction order satisfied the PLRA. Id. at 1922.
103 Id. at 1947. The State argued that the order issued by the three-judge court did not re-
quire an actual release of inmates, per se. See id. at 1937–39. Specifically, the order directed
California to reduce its overcapacity, and reserved for the State the choice of methodology.
Id. Therefore, the State could have come into conformance via prison construction, out-of-
state transfers, and by increasing prison medical staff. Id. Because these less restrictive mea-
sures existed, the State argued that the three-judge court did not meet the requirements of the
PLRA. Id. The three-judge court and Supreme Court found, however, that there were, in fact,
no meaningful plans to transfer inmates out of the State. Id. at 1937–38. Moreover, building new
prisons was an unreasonable initiative, because California did not have adequate funding. Id.
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California is now scrambling to comply with the Supreme Court ruling.104 Al-
though the population reduction order was motivated by a class of inmates who suf-
fered from medical maltreatment, the Court made it clear that relief must also apply to
“future class members” who may sustain injury as a result of these gross inadequacies,
and therefore the State’s current proposals to bring the penitentiary system into com-
pliance do not have to affect only those inmates with severe medical problems.105 The
Supreme Court did not expressly instruct California on the methodology it should
use to achieve the population reduction.106 However, California’s proposals should be
scrutinized by similarly positioned States, policy makers, and the judiciary for their
effectiveness and, the focus of this Note, their constitutionality.
II. CALIFORNIA RESPONDS: PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT OF 2011
California has until the end of June 2013 to reduce its total prison population
until the facilities operate at no more than 137.5% of design capacity.107 The Supreme
Court refrained from instructing California officials on how to best achieve this
goal.108 The Court did warn against the dangers of hastily releasing prisoners who still
pose a threat to society, though it simultaneously recognized the likely need of intro-
ducing inmates back into society before the official conclusion of their sentencing
terms.109 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the State could comply with the order
by building new prisons, transferring inmates to out-of-state or county facilities,
increasing its use of “good-time” credits, and routing “low-risk” and “technical
at 1938. Staff expansion was not a viable option because the prisons could not attract personnel
and the hostile environment was not conducive to employee retention. Id. In summation, the
Court found that “[a] long history of failed remedial orders, together with substantial evidence
of overcrowding’s deleterious effects on the provision of care” indicated that the State would
be unable to bring its prisons into conformance without decreasing the inmate population under
the weight of a judicial mandate. Id. at 1939.
104 See, e.g., Jens Erik Gould, As California Fights Prison Overcrowding, Some See a
Golden Opportunity, TIME, Sept. 29, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599
,2094840,00.html.
105 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1940.
106 Information About California’s Prison Population Reduction Plans, PRISON L. OFF.
1 (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/Population,Oct14,2011.pdf [hereinafter
PRISON L. OFF.].
107 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923. See also PRISON L. OFF., supra note 106, at 1.
Specifically, by November 28, 2011, California’s thirty-three adult prisons were to be operat-
ing at no greater than 167% of design capacity. By May 24, 2012, that percentage must have
dropped to 155, and by November 26, 2012, the prisons could not be running at more than
147% capacity. State Responds to Three-Judge Court’s Order Requiring a Reduction in Prison
Crowding, CDCR TODAY (June 7, 2011), http://cdcrtoday.blogspot.com/2011/06/state-responds
-to-three-judge-courts.html.
108 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923.
109 Id.
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parole” offenders through local programs instead of State prisons.110 California’s
reduction plans, the most significant of which—Public Safety Realignment of 2011—
commenced on October 1, 2011,111 incorporate a revised parole system, an alternative
custody program, and the reallocation of inmates that enter the penitentiary system
after October 1, 2011.112 Realignment, now in effect, hinges on a shift in power. The
State is implementing the aforementioned changes largely by giving local jurisdic-
tions authority over low-level offenders, juvenile offenders, and adult parolees.113
Although the focus of this Note is on one of the programs designed for adult parolees—
the Alternative Custody Program—because of their importance to California’s reme-
dial efforts, the other measures warrant a summary glance before disposal.
At the outset, it is important to note that, contrary to public fears and inmates’
hopes, Realignment does not provide for early release or mid-sentence transfers of
inmates to other institutions.114 Under the plan, non-violent, non-serious, and non–sex
offenders will be incarcerated in county jails instead of State prisons; however, the
typical sentence length will remain unchanged.115 Prior to Realignment, these classes
of convicts would have been sent to State prison.116 There are still certain types of
offenders that will be required to serve out their incarceration in a State facility: sex
offenders, and individuals found guilty of serious or violent felonies and certain
non-serious and non-violent crimes as defined by State law,117 or who have prior
110 Id. at 1923, 1929, 1937–39.
111 Public Safety Realignment, formally titled Assembly Bill 109 (“AB 109”) and endorsed
on April 4, 2011, by current California Governor, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., is California’s pri-
mary effort to address prison overcrowding. 2011 Public Safety Realignment (AB 109): DAPO
Informational Overview, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca
.gov/Parole/parole-realignment.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) [hereinafter DAPO].
112 For more general information on each component of AB 109, Public Safety Realignment
of 2011, see generally Public Safety Realignment: The Cornerstone of California’s Solution
to Reduce Overcrowding, Costs, and Recidivism, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION,
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/index.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
113 Governor Brown Signs Legislation to Improve Public Safety and Empower Local Law
Enforcement, OFF. GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (Apr. 5, 2011), http://gov.ca.gov/news
.php?id=16964. Between 2011 and 2012, it is estimated that approximately twenty thousand
prisoners will be placed under county authority. Barry Krisberg & Eleanor Taylor-Nicholson,
Criminal Justice: Realignment: A Bold New Era in California Corrections, CHIEF JUSTICE
EARL WARREN INST. ON L. & SOC. POL’Y, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY L. SCH. 4 (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/REALIGNMENT_FINAL9.28.11.pdf (citing an estimation
released by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation).
114 PRISON L. OFF., supra note 106, at 1.
115 Overview AB 109 & AB 117: Public Safety Realignment of 2011, CAL. DEP’T CORREC-
TIONS & REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/AB_109-PowerPoint
-Overview.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Overview AB 109].
116 See id.
117 Id. (including possessing horse meat, offering bribes to members of the Legislature,
certain types of physical abuse, and attacking a law enforcement official).
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convictions of such crimes.118 The counties, although likely to be burdened with the
sudden influx of new prisoners,119 are not left without options for alleviation. For
example, local jails retain the right to “contract back with the [s]tate” to transfer
offenders within their jurisdiction to State facilities, and to place convicts in public
community correctional facilities.120 The counties are also charged with overseeing
more newly released inmates on parole.121
With more responsibility accorded to the counties, State prison populations
should drop, and California governor, Edmund G. Brown, hopes that there will be
a concurrent decrease in recidivism rates and incarceration costs.122 He relies on the
notion that the counties are better positioned to deal effectively with inmate sentencing,
incarceration, and rehabilitation.123 Therefore, the State is giving counties discretion
in their respective approaches and encouraging alternative methods to incarcera-
tion that other States have adopted to successfully decrease jail populations and
118 Id.
119 To assert that counties are concerned about Realignment and the increase in local jail
populations would be an understatement. Local jails are also battling overcapacity—it is not
a problem that is unique to the State prisons. Currently, there are, at a minimum, twenty
counties whose jails are subject to “court-ordered capacity limits,” and “local officials ex-
press fears [that] they will become targets for prisoner rights litigation.” Krisberg & Taylor-
Nicholson, supra note 113, at 4; see also Nick Monacelli, Sac Sheriff: State Realignment Plan
Is ‘Asinine,’ NEWS10.NET (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.news10.net/news/local/story.aspx?storyid
=153923 (highlighting Sacramento County Sheriff Scott Jones’s concerns over counties’ lack
of preparation for Realignment, the short time frame for implementation, and lack of funds
from the State); Rebecca Robinson, The Great Uncrowding, MONTEREY CNTY. WKLY. (Sept. 22,
2011), http://www.montereycountyweekly.com/news/2011/sep/22/great-uncrowding/ (inter-
viewing a chief deputy sheriff in Salinas, California who expressed concerns over the increase
in jail violence as a result of the impending increase in inmate population).
120 Overview AB 109, supra note 115.
121 The non-violent and non-serious offenders that are currently housed in State prisons,
when released, will be supervised by the counties instead of the State, although inmates with
three strikes and certain prespecified, high-risk offenses will remain under State control. Id.
For parole-related numerical data and estimations under AB 109, see Krisberg & Taylor-
Nicholson, supra note 113, at 3–4.
122 Marisa Lagos, State’s Radical Prison Reform Plan Ready to Start, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 2,
2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/10/02/MNM71L9Q8Q.DTL.
Note that as of 2011, California was spending approximately $45,006 per year to incarcerate
a single inmate. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS: YEAR AT A GLANCE 10 (2011)
[hereinafter CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., GLANCE]. With Realignment, State finance ana-
lysts project that $53 million will be saved in incarceration costs in 2011 alone, followed by
$125 million in 2012, and $338 million in 2013. Tracey Kaplan, State’s New Realignment
Plan Will Let Prisoners Out Earlier, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL, Sept. 25, 2011, http://www
.santacruzsentinel.com/ci_18973356. A reduction in recidivism rates is understandably an
important goal for Governor Brown, considering that recidivism increases both jail pop-
ulation and costs, and California currently has one of the steepest rates in the nation—67.5%.
See Gould, supra note 104.
123 See Lagos, supra note 122.
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recidivism rates.124 California, however, is not shifting the entire burden onto the
county jails. It is promoting similar programs in the State system, and one of those
programs—the Alternative Custody Program for primary child caregivers—is con-
stitutionally problematic.
III. SCRUTINIZING THE ALTERNATIVE CUSTODY PROGRAM
A. The Nature of the Program
The Alternative Custody Program, a “community-based program focused on re-
entry and family reunification,” is returning qualifying inmates to their communities,
where they are completing their sentences in a state-approved facility or residence.125
During that time, they remain under the authority of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR),126 report to parole agents, are required to
wear GPS tracking devices, and must participate in treatment programs.127
In order to be eligible for the program, effective in 2011,128 the inmate must sat-
isfy a strict set of requirements. According to the text of the statute, the program is
offered only to “female inmates, pregnant inmates, or inmates who were primary care-
givers of dependent children immediately prior to incarceration.”129 Specifically, in
order to be considered a primary caregiver, the inmate must be the biological, step,
adoptive, or foster parent of a child who is under eighteen years of age at the time
the prisoner would be admitted to the program, and who shared a residence with the
inmate “for the majority of the year preceding the inmate’s arrest.”130 The inmate
must also have a State prison sentence lasting for a specific period of time131 and must
124 See Gould, supra note 104 (“The text of the realignment bill passed by California’s
legislators suggests many possible alternative programs, including employment counseling,
home detention with electronic monitoring, substance abuse programs, mental health treat-
ment and mandatory community service.”). Note that other initiatives under AB 109 include
GPS monitoring, medical parole, and alternative custody programs. See DAPO, supra note 111.
125 Fact Sheet: Alternative Custody Program, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION
1 (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Operations/FOPS/docs /ACP-Fact-Sheet
-Final.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
126 For more information on CDCR, see CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, http://
www.cdcr.ca.gov/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
127 Fact Sheet, supra note 125, at 1 (citing CDCR’s continued authority over the inmates and
the requirement that program participants report to a Parole Agent). Regarding inmate tracking,
“[a]n alternative custody program shall include the use of electronic monitoring, global posi-
tioning system devices, or other supervising devices for the purpose of helping to verify a
participant’s compliance with the rules.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.05(e) (West Supp. 2012).
Treatment programs are intended to help the inmates transition back into their communities
upon release. Id. § 1170.05(f)(1), (2); see also id. § 1170.05(j).
128 Fact Sheet, supra note 125, at 1.
129 PENAL § 1170.05(a).
130 Id. §§ 1170.05(p)(1)–(4).
131 Id. § 1170.05(c).
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apply for the program on a voluntary basis.132 It is not offered to inmates convicted
currently or previously of a violent or serious felony,133 with sex offender status,134
deemed—by certain department standards—to be high-risk,135 or guilty of an escape
within the past ten years.136 Inmates that are eligible and accepted into the program will
be placed in a transitional care facility, a residential drug or treatment program, or a
residential home,137 and they may be sent back to prison “with or without cause.”138
Although the Alternative Custody Program, in the statutory text, does not ex-
pressly state that it is available to male inmates, it is logical to infer from the wording
that men may qualify: “female inmates, pregnant inmates, or inmates who were pri-
mary caregivers of dependent children.”139 The last clause, emphasized here, appears
to be role-based and not gender-based, with the only relevant factor being whether the
inmate was primarily responsible for the care of the child. However, the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation—the overseer of the Alternative Cus-
tody Program—announced on September 12, 2011, that “the program will initially
be offered to qualifying female inmates. Participation may be offered at a later date
to male inmates, at the discretion of the Secretary of CDCR.”140 CDCR further
stated, “[it] estimates 45 percent of its female inmates will be potentially eligible for
[the Alternative Custody Program].”141 In addition, CDCR spokeswoman, Dana
Toyama, told news reporters that male inmates may eventually be able to participate
in the program, and cited money and overcrowding as reasons.142 But is the Alternative
Custody Program constitutional?
132 Id. § 1170.05(a).
133 Id. §§ 1170.05(d)(1)–(2).
134 Id. § 1170.05(d)(3).
135 Id. § 1170.05(d)(4).
136 Id. § 1170.05(d)(5).
137 Id. § 1170.05(b). Note that a residential home refers to “a structure in an area that is
zoned for residential habitation, and can be located and identified by a street number and street
name.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3078(c) (2011). A residential drug or treatment home is “an
approved program located in a structure in an area that is zoned for residential habitation, that
can be located and identified by a street number and street name, and which provides substance
abuse or other treatment.” Id. § 3078(e). A transitional care facility is “an approved facility
located in a structure in an area that is zoned for residential habitation, and can be located and
identified by a street number and street name and which assists in the transition from a custody
or treatment environment to an independent living environment.” Id. § 3078(d). Regardless
of where the inmate is placed, she cannot leave the premises except during certain hours, and
she will always be subject to police search. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170.05(g)(1)–(2).
138 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.05(m).
139 Id. § 1170.05(a) (emphasis added).
140 Fact Sheet, supra note 125, at 1.
141 Id. at 3.
142 California Weighs Program to Release Thousands of Female Inmates, FOX NEWS
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/09/13/california-weighs-program-to-release
-thousands-female-inmates/ [hereinafter California Weighs].
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B. The Alternative Custody Program Is Unconstitutional
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.143
Classifications drawn on the basis of race are “inherently suspect,”144 even in the
prison context.145 Such discrimination warrants a strict scrutiny analysis,146 and
may survive judicial review only if the government can prove that the classifica-
tion is essential to the accomplishment of a “compelling governmental interest.”147
When the government discriminates on the basis of gender, however, a lower level
of scrutiny—“intermediate scrutiny”—is applied, because courts have held that sex-
based classifications are less suspect for improper and invidious intent.148 Summarily,
the government’s gender-based categorization must have an “exceedingly persuasive
justification,”149 and in order to prove the existence of such, the government must show
that the classification “serve[s] [an] important governmental objective[ ] and . . . [is]
substantially related to the achievement of [that] objective[ ].”150
143 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
144 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (“Racial and ethnic dis-
tinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial exam-
ination.”); see also Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be ana-
lyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
145 See, e.g., Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff’d, 390 U.S. 333
(1968) (holding that racial segregation in prisons and jails violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
146 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984) (“[Racial] classifications are
subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by
a compelling governmental interest and must be ‘necessary . . . to the accomplishment’ of
their legitimate purpose.” (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964))).
147 Id. at 432.
148 In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Supreme Court verbalized what has be-
come known as the intermediate scrutiny test. Justice Brennan held that intermediate scrutiny
should be applied to gender-based classifications, stating, “[t]o withstand constitutional chal-
lenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Id.
at 197.
149 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Kirchberg
v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)).
150 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
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The Alternative Custody Program, as CDCR151 is currently implementing it,
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny review, and it should not pass. Although
its statutory text establishes a non–gender-specific classification—eligibility will be
extended to “inmates who were primary caregivers of dependent children immedi-
ately prior to incarceration”152—as noted earlier, CDCR recently expressed its intent
to allow only female inmates to apply to the program now and in the immediately
foreseeable future.153 In order for a government action to be challenged on equal
protection grounds, it does not have to be gender discriminatory on its face.154 In
other words, “the law in its very terms [does not have to] draw[ ] a distinction among
people based on gender.”155 It simply must have a discriminatory impact on one gen-
der fueled by an invidious purpose.156 It is clear that the Alternative Custody Program’s
eligibility requirements do not discriminate against male inmates by their statutory
terms. However, there is strong evidence of invidious intent, as demonstrated by the
program’s discriminatory enactment and impact: CDCR is currently offering the pro-
gram only to female inmates and therefore allowing only female inmates to serve the
rest of their sentences at home.157
In order to avoid the more stringent intermediate level of judicial scrutiny, CDCR
may refute the showing of invidious intent by arguing that the non–gender-specific
151 It is important, for procedural purposes, to note that the CDCR is a State agency and
therefore is subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. For information on
CDCR, see About CDCR, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca
.gov/About_CDCR/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
152 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.05(a) (West Supp. 2012).
153 See Fact Sheet, supra note 125, at 1; see also California Weighs, supra note 142.
154 For an example of a gender-specific classification that disadvantaged men on its face,
see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (successful equal protection challenge to a State law
that imposed a lower drinking age for women than for men). For an example of a gender-spe-
cific classification that disadvantaged women on its face, see United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996) (deciding that Virginia Military Institute’s categorical exclusion of women
violated the equal protection clause).
155 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 757 (Vicki
Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006).
156 Personal Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (“When a statute gender-
neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that its effects [on a gender] are disproportion-
ately adverse, a two-fold inquiry is thus appropriate. The first question is whether the statutory
classification is indeed neutral in the sense that it is not gender-based. If the classification it-
self, covert or overt, is not based upon gender, the second question is whether the adverse effect
reflects invidious gender-based discrimination. In this second inquiry, impact provides an impor-
tant starting point, but purposeful discrimination is the condition that offends the Constitution.”
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 155, at 757
(“[I]f a law is facially gender neutral, proving a gender classification requires demonstrating
that there is both a discriminatory impact to the law and a discriminatory purpose behind it.”).
157 Note that the inmates may serve the remainder of their sentences at a residential home,
at a residential drug or treatment program, or at a transitional care facility. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170.05(b); supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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wording in the statute is indicative of its gender-neutral purpose. If the State has no
intent to advantage women over men, then a court will analyze the constitutionality
of the program under a more favorable, lenient standard. That standard, referred to as
rational basis, would operate on the presumption that the program is constitutional,
and the program will be upheld by a court as long as CDCR can assert that its imple-
mentation is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”158 Convincing a court
of the absence of invidious purpose would be an extremely difficult task for CDCR,
however, given the fact that CDCR made express statements to the contrary—that
CDCR intends to offer the program only to female inmates at this time.159
With discriminatory enactment, impact, and intent established, CDCR, in order
to survive intermediate scrutiny review, would have to prove that its implementation
of the Alternative Custody Program—with eligibility extended only to women—is
substantially related to an important governmental interest.160 Its reasoning for the
unequal treatment must be “genuine,” and not simply a plausible explanation.161
Importantly, CDCR cannot “rely on overbroad generalizations about the different
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”162
CDCR has not specifically stated its motivations for offering the program only
to women now and in the immediate future. It did suggest that if the program is ex-
tended to men in the future, it would be for prison cost and capacity reasons.163 CDCR
has expressed, however, its rationale for the program in general, and, because it is only
offering it to female inmates now, it may be assumed that its reasons for the program
and its reasons for limiting eligibility to women are synonymous.
One factor motivating the Alternative Custody Program is that the program will
help California come into compliance with the Supreme Court order to reduce pris-
on overcrowding.164 Indeed, that is an important government interest. The State is
158 See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is
that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn . . .
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
159 California Weighs, supra note 142; see also Fact Sheet, supra note 125.
160 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish
that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).
161 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“The justification must be
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.”).
162 Id.
163 See Fact Sheet, supra note 125, at 1 (“[T]he program will initially be offered to qualify-
ing female inmates. Participation may be offered at a later date to male inmates, at the discre-
tion of the Secretary of CDCR.”); California Weighs, supra note 142 and accompanying text.
164 The legislation was originally signed by former California Governor Arnold Schwarze-
negger—who was also grappling with the system’s crowding problem—and was first offered
just months after the Supreme Court order. See Fact Sheet, supra note 125, at 1; see also
MILENA NELSON, ASSEMB. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, S.B. 1266 BILL ANALYSIS, at 11 (Cal.
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compelled to comply with the mandate and is not at liberty to continue offending the
Constitution by subjecting inmates to Eighth Amendment violations. The critical
inquiry, then, is not whether the State’s objective is important, but whether the dis-
criminatory enactment is substantially related to the attainment of that objective.165
An estimated 45% of female inmates could be eligible for the Alternative Custody
Program, but CDCR estimates that the percentage actually admitted is likely to be sig-
nificantly lower.166 Approximately 94% of California’s inmates in the State prison
system are male.167 Releasing offenders that are mothers as opposed to those that are
fathers bears no relation to the interest of reducing total inmate population. A classi-
fication based on motherhood, in effect, is an illogical means of achieving a reduction
in capacity given the fact that California prisons are housing, by an overwhelming
majority, male convicts.168 The State has the burden of justifying the gender classi-
fication,169 and, based on the reasoning above, it likely will not meet that burden
given the lack of the requisite relatedness. Therefore, a reduction in prison over-
crowding, though an important objective, is a constitutionally insufficient reason for
offering the program only to female inmates.
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation also hopes that the
Alternative Custody Program will halt the “cycle of incarceration in families”170 and
aid in the successful rehabilitation of inmates.171 CDCR spokeswoman, Dana Toyama,
stated in an interview:
Time and time again, family interaction is one of the indicators of
a rehabilitation success . . . . [CDCR] want[s] to reunite family,
incarcerated mothers with their families. And . . . [CDCR has]
2010), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1251-1300/sb_1266_cfa_20100621
_101257_asm_comm.html [hereinafter S.B. 1266 BILL ANALYSIS] (“The creation of an alter-
native custody program would help to alleviate the overcrowding crisis in the state prison,
by allowing non-violent low-risk inmates [to] remain at home with their families.”).
165 This is in keeping with the intermediate scrutiny test. See supra notes 148–58 and
accompanying text.
166 California Weighs, supra note 142.
167 Id.
168 See Jack Dolan, Prison Officials Are Set to Let Some Female Inmates Out Early,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/13/local/la-me-prison-home
-20110913 (“If a significant number of the state’s roughly 150,000 incarcerated men could
qualify for the program as ‘primary caregivers’ for their children, early release would go a
long way toward easing overcrowding . . . .”).
169 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“The burden of justification is
demanding and it rests entirely on the State.”).
170 California Weighs, supra note 142.
171 Interview by Maureen Cavanaugh with Dana Toyama, Spokeswoman, Cal. Dep’t of
Corr. & Rehab., Moms in California Prisons May Be Eligible for Early Release, KPBS.ORG
(Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2011/sep/14/mothers-calif-prisons-may-be-eligible
-community-re/ [hereinafter Moms in California].
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seen time and time again that family interaction is one of the
biggest indicators of an inmate’s success. And that’s what
[CDCR is] hoping to obtain implementing this program. . . .
Hopefully, [CDCR] see[s] a reduced impact on inner [sic] gen-
erational incarceration . . . .172
California’s Secretary of State Prisons, Matthew Cate, echoed Toyama’s view,173
and Senator Liu,174 author of the bill underlying the Alternative Custody Program,
stated “[c]hildren of inmates are much more likely than their peers to become in-
carcerated. . . . Alternative custody will allow families to maintain relationships, and
mothers will be less likely to re-offend.”175 Considering California’s battle with over-
capacitated prisons and the Supreme Court’s mandate for a reduction in the prison
population, successful rehabilitation and a decline in recidivism are arguably im-
portant government interests. The State maintains that family interaction reduces the
likelihood of repeat offenses and intergenerational incarceration, but it does not argue
that the family interaction must be limited to mother-child exchanges in order to be
effective.176 If a male inmate who would otherwise meet the requirements of a “primary
caregiver”177 partakes in the family dynamics and social setting to the same extent as
a similarly positioned female inmate, then drawing the eligibility requirements along
gender lines does not appear to be sufficiently tailored to the stated interests. The State
would need to show that male primary caregivers, once released back into their homes,
would not engage in family interactions, or that such activity would have no bearing
on their decision to reoffend. Absent such a finding, this gender-based rationale fails
the relationship test required by intermediate scrutiny, and thus does not withstand
constitutional analysis.
The State estimates that the program will save it money on incarceration costs.178
When an inmate is placed in the Alternative Custody Program, the inmate’s housing
172 Id.
173 Dolan, supra note 168 (“The program is ‘a step in breaking the intergenerational cycle
of incarceration,’ state prisons Secretary Matthew Cate said, arguing that ‘family involve-
ment is one of the biggest indicators of an inmate’s rehabilitation.’”).
174 The author of S.B. 1266, the bill signed by Governor Schwarzenegger and what is now
§ 1170.05 of the California Penal Code, is Carol Liu, California State Senator from the 21st
District. See generally S.B. 1266 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 164 (analysis of the Bill as pre-
pared by legal counsel for the Assembly Committee on Public Safety). For more information
on Senator Liu, see her official website, SENATOR CAROL LIU—21ST DISTRICT, http://sd21
.senate.ca.gov/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
175 S.B. 1266 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 164, at 7.
176 See Dolan, supra note 168; Moms in California, supra note 171.
177 For the “primary caregiver” statutory requirements, see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170.05
(p)(1)–(4) (West Supp. 2012); supra note 130 and accompanying text.
178 The State does not finance the Alternative Custody Program, and thus it estimates that
it will save $6 million in 2012. Fact Sheet, supra note 125, at 2.
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expenses are covered by participating non-profit and community organizations.179
The State also ceases to pay for the inmate’s food and transportation.180 California
spends approximately $45,000 each year to incarcerate one inmate,181 and it is the
frontrunner among the States in correctional spending.182 Therefore, it is no wonder,
and arguably an important governmental goal, for the State to try to reduce its penal
expenses and place tax dollars in competing venues. However, in no way can the
program’s limitation to women be substantially related to that end. The State would
need to show that the gender distinction is necessary to the achievement of the cost
reduction, but such an argument would be counterintuitive and unlikely to succeed.
With most of the State’s inmates being male,183 it follows that most of the incarcer-
ation dollars are spent on males, and thus the greatest savings would be incurred by
placing them in cheaper programs such as Alternative Custody. To argue that it is
necessary, for cost saving purposes, to limit eligibility to females runs contrary to
this simple logic, and thus a court would be unlikely to find that the gender discrim-
ination, under this rationale, survives intermediate scrutiny review.
A potential reason for the classification is the notion that it is best for the
children if the mother returns home. According to the author of the senate bill
underlying the Alternative Custody Program:
Incarcerated women are not the only individuals negatively im-
pacted by incarceration; families and communities have been
devastated by women’s imprisonment. . . . Most of California’s
incarcerated mothers are the primary caregivers of dependent
children and hope to return home to their children. While the
vast majority of children of incarcerated men continue to live
with their mothers, children of incarcerated women are more
likely to end up living with other relatives or in foster care.184
Child welfare is, at the very minimum, an important government concern.185
However, the fact that the children of incarcerated mothers, compared to those of
179 Id. (“When [the Alternative Custody Program] was enacted into law, several non-profit
and community organizations offered their programs free of charge to [Alternative Custody
Program] participants. Under [the Alternative Custody Program], inmates may live in approved
residences, but the state is not responsible for their housing costs.”).
180 Id.
181 CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., GLANCE, supra note 122, at 10.
182 One in 100, supra note 3, at 11.
183 California Weighs, supra note 142.
184 S.B. 1266 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 164, at 8 (citing M. ANNE POWELL & CLARE NOLAN,
CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, CALIFORNIA STATE PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN: FINDINGS FROM
THE 1997 SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (2003)).
185 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“The State, of course, has a duty of
the highest order to protect the interests of minor children. . . . The goal of granting custody
based on the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial governmental interest for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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imprisoned fathers, are more likely to be placed in the care of an entity other than
his or her parent does not seem to suggest that only mothers should be eligible for the
program. At this time, the program’s terms do not include a set number of “slots”
available for inmates—a quota—where inmates would have to compete with each
other for enrollment.186 If that were the case, then perhaps the State could endeavor
to argue that because children whose mothers are in prison are more likely to live
with an individual other than their parent and the goal is to keep children with their
parents, the choice to offer the set number of enrollment spaces to mothers is substan-
tially related to the achievement of that goal. The more mothers that the State places
back at home, the more children will be placed in the care of a parent.187 However,
as stated above, the program does not have a maximum enrollment.188
Moreover, the text of the legislation requires that the dependent child have lived
with the inmate for the “majority of the year preceding the inmate’s arrest.”189 The
State may be concerned that by releasing a father (who fits the statutory definition
of “primary caregiver”) there will be little impact on the child based on the statistical
likelihood that the child, during the father’s incarceration, continued to be cared for
by the mother. In that situation, further evidentiary findings would be required for
a showing that the classification is substantially related to child welfare. This would
be a difficult burden, considering that there may be benefits to the child in having two
parents in the home as opposed to one. For example, inmates are allowed to engage in
occupations once they are in the program.190 If the father rejoins the household and con-
tributes to the family income, then that would be a foreseeable benefit to the child.191
Additionally, the father, assuming he meets the requirements of being a “primary care-
giver,” may be able to meaningfully contribute to the child’s upbringing and provide
other social benefits. Therefore, limiting eligibility to female inmates alone does not
appear to be substantially related to the furtherance of the child’s welfare.
Another potential reason for the classification is the fear that releasing fathers—
male inmates—will threaten society’s safety.192 Senator Liu, author of the program’s
legislation, stated:
While over half of the men in prison were incarcerated for violent
crimes, just 30% of women were convicted of violence. In fact,
female inmates are more likely to be victims of violent crimes
186 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.05 (West Supp. 2012).
187 See, e.g., S.B. 1266 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 164, at 8.
188 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.05.
189 Id. § 1170.05(p)(3).
190 Id. § 1170.05(j) (“[P]rogram participants [may] seek and retain employment in the
community . . . .”).
191 Adam Thomas & Isabel Sawhill, For Love and Money? The Impact of Family Structure
on Family Income, 15 FUTURE CHILD. 57, 57–58 (2005). See generally id. at 57–69 (analyzing
the benefits that children gain by living with two parents in a single environment).
192 See, e.g., S.B. 1266 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 164, at 7.
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than to be the perpetrators. . . . Given this, it is not surprising that
over two-thirds of women are classified as low risk . . . .193
Public safety is undoubtedly an important government objective, and the Supreme
Court advised California to comply with the population reduction order in a manner
that does not undermine public safety.194 However, merely proffering statistics con-
cerning the violent nature of the crimes committed by women as compared to men, and
the resulting levels of risk each gender poses, will not satisfy intermediate scrutiny.
There is a gender-neutral alternative to the discriminatory enactment, and the text of
the program’s statutory basis already employs it. The statute’s requirements for eli-
gibility maintain that the only inmates that can apply for the program are those with
records of non-violent and non-serious crimes.195 They cannot be sex offenders.196
They must be low-risk, as analyzed under CDCR standards,197 and they cannot have
any escapes on their record during the past ten years.198 If the concern is public safety,
and women are being treated as low risks to society based on the nature of their crimes,
then a man who qualifies, under this set of standards—which focuses on low-risk, non-
felonious convictions—and thus poses the same level of risk, is, for purposes of public
safety, no different than the female offender. These eligibility requirements should
alleviate the worry of a threat to public safety because once the filtering process is
complete, the eligible men and women presumably would be identical in terms of the
severity of their criminal history and the risk that they pose to the public. Therefore,
continuing to draw a line on the basis of gender and prohibiting men from applying
to the program, all under the guise of public safety, is unfounded and fails to meet
the requirements of intermediate scrutiny. The sex-based classification is not nec-
essary to preserving public safety, as the text of the statute provides gender-neutral
requirements to ensure that only low-risk inmates, whether men or women, are ad-
mitted into the program.
In summation, each proffered and potential reason that the State has or may have
for implementing the Alternative Custody Program in a discriminatory manner fails
to satisfy intermediate scrutiny review. Although each goal that the State hopes to
obtain through the program is valid and important, the discrimination against male
inmates is not substantially related to the furtherance of any of those objectives. In-
deed, in some instances, the gender classification appears to impede the achievement
of the goal.
193 Id. at 7–8.
194 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1944 (2011).
195 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170.05(d)(1)–(2).
196 Id. § 1170.05 (d)(3).
197 Id. § 1170.05 (d)(4).
198 Id. § 1170.05 (d)(5).
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IV. BRINGING THE ALTERNATIVE CUSTODY PROGRAM
INTO CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE
The Alternative Custody Program is still in its infant stages, with its imple-
mentation beginning in 2011.199 The text of the statute itself, as discussed in Part III,
does not pose an equal protection problem. It is gender-neutral on its face and does
not discriminate against male inmates.200 Therefore, a redrafting of the legislation
is not necessary. It is CDCR’s intended enactment of the program that runs afoul of
the Constitution. The constitutional flaws with the implementation and failure to pass
intermediate scrutiny can be remedied with a change in the program’s execution. The
CDCR should adhere to the clear text of the statute and extend eligibility to both
male and female inmates who meet the statute’s specified requirements.
The inmate’s sex should be irrelevant to CDCR’s evaluation of a potential en-
rollee. The statute lists factors that differentiate between the inmates on bases other
than gender. The discerning factors, such as prior criminal history,201 presence of a
minor in the household,202 and degree of threat posed to society,203 are constitutionally
neutral criteria that would pass judicial review. In the absence of gender discriminatory
intent, as noted in Part III, the program would be subject to rational basis scrutiny.204
To survive attack under rational basis, the State would merely have to prove that the
criteria that it uses to determine who is admitted into the program, which would not
include gender considerations, are reasonably related to the achievement of any legit-
imate government objective.205
Under rational basis, the State may choose206 to argue that it is seeking to reduce
prison overcrowding while minimizing the threat to society and maximizing the ben-
efit. The argument may be framed as follows: the Alternative Custody Program allows
the State to remove inmates from its overpopulated—and therefore constitutionally
199 Fact Sheet, supra note 125, at 1.
200 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.05(a), supra note 139 and accompanying text.
201 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170.05(d)(1)–(3), (5).
202 Id. §§ 1170.05(a), (p)(1)–(4).
203 Id. § 1170.05(d)(4).
204 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
205 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 155, at 678 (“The Supreme Court generally has been ex-
tremely deferential to the government when applying the rational basis test. [T]he Court often
has said that a law should be upheld if it is possible to conceive any legitimate purpose for
the law, even if it was not the government’s actual purpose. The result is that it is very rare
for the Supreme Court to find that a law fails the rational basis test.” (emphasis added)). See
also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
206 Recall that under the rational basis test, the State may argue any conceivable purpose
for its actions, as long as it is legitimate. The definition of legitimacy is broad. Legitimate
government purposes include “[p]ublic safety, public health, and public morals . . . but they
are not the only ones. Virtually any goal that is not forbidden by the Constitution will be
deemed sufficient to meet the rational basis test.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 155, at 681.
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troublesome—prisons and, while maintaining control over the inmates’ whereabouts,
place them under watch in the community. Introducing inmates back into society
while they are still serving out their sentences should and does raise concerns over the
potential impact on public safety.207 Indeed, those concerns are accounted for in the
program’s restrictions on eligibility.208 By discriminating against inmates on the
basis of prior convictions and allowing only those with non-violent and other low-
severity crimes to enroll, that threat to society is reduced and controlled. Therefore,
such restrictions are rationally related to the preservation of public safety.
The primary caregiver requirement allows the State to ensure that children are
reunited with their parents, potentially provides for additional household income,
supervision, and stability, and lessens the need for alternative child services, such
as foster care.209 By having the opportunity to seek employment during their enroll-
ment in the program, the inmates may make meaningful contributions to society and,
as productive citizens, be less likely to offend again in the future.210 With inmates
now residing in their communities instead of behind bars, the State—which is not
funding the program—will save money on prison costs and be able to allocate those
funds to other societal needs, thereby creating a benefit to society.211 Summarily, the
program’s eligibility requirements as outlined by the statute, absent any effort by
CDCR to add gender to those criteria, are rationally and reasonably related to legit-
imate purposes. Therefore, if the Alternative Custody Program is implemented ac-
cording to its statutory terms and CDCR extends eligibility now to males as well as
to females, then from this point on, the program will pass constitutional muster, and
the equal protection infringement will cease to exist.
CONCLUSION
Prison overcrowding is not a problem that is unique to California.212 California
is simply a strong case in point, and its particularly heinous penal environment cap-
tured the attention of the Supreme Court. The Court, in 2011, found that these
gruesome conditions, specifically the lack of adequate medical care, were the result
of gross prison over-crowding.213 Other States are not immune to similar holdings;214
207 Note that the Supreme Court cautioned California against putting society at peril
when carrying out the prison population reduction order. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910,
1923 (2011).
208 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.05(d).
209 See, e.g., S.B. 1266 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 164.
210 Id. See also supra note 190 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 179–83 and accompanying text.
212 See Doyle, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
213 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
214 See Doyle, supra note 13 and accompanying text; Brief for the States of Louisiana
et al., supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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thus the nation is anxiously observing California as it scrambles to come into com-
pliance with the Court order. Although many initiatives are now in place, only one
has been the focus of this Note: the Alternative Custody Program.
The program’s statutory underpinnings are constitutionally sound.215 It draws
the parameters of eligibility on benign, non-immutable factors such as whether the in-
mate has a dependent child at home,216 the nature of the inmate’s criminal record,217
and the level of threat that the convict poses to society.218 It does not discriminate
on the basis of gender.219 The CDCR, the State agency charged with the program’s
implementation, is, however, removing the program from the confines of the Con-
stitution. CDCR is taking a statute with non–gender-specific classifications and
purposefully executing it in a gender-discriminatory manner.220 Intermediate scru-
tiny, the level of judicial review appropriate for gender-based equal protection
inquiries,221 requires the State to prove that the sex-based classification is “exceed-
ingly . . . justifi[ed]”;222 that it is “substantially related” to an “important governmen-
tal objective[ ].”223 As this Note has explained, California, through CDCR, cannot
make such a showing. The government’s motivations driving the program do not
bear a substantial relationship to the requirement that only females may be eligible
for Alternative Custody Program. At times, that criterion even runs contrary to the
government’s objectives. Therefore, the Alternative Custody Program, as currently
enacted by CDCR, does not withstand intermediate scrutiny. It is unconstitutional
on equal protection grounds.
This is not to say that the program is hopelessly condemned. The statutory text
underlying the initiative is acceptable. It does not discriminate on the basis of gender.
The factors that frame inmate eligibility survive the applicable rational basis review.
The discerning criteria, such as inmate criminal history and presence of a dependent
child, are rationally, reasonably related to a legitimate government interest, presum-
ably the desire to reduce prison overcrowding while minimizing the threat to society
and maximizing the benefit. Therefore, the resolution is relatively simple. The CDCR
should restrict itself to the eligibility requirements outlined in the statute. There is
a textual presumption that the program is available to both men and women,224 and
indeed, the Constitution requires it.
215 See supra notes 151–57 and accompanying text.
216 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170.05(a), (p)(1)–(4) (West Supp. 2012).
217 Id. §§ 1170.05(d)(1)–(3), (5).
218 Id. § 1170.05(d)(4).
219 See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
220 See supra Part III.
221 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also supra note 148 and accom-
panying text.
222 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
223 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
224 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.05(a) (West Supp. 2012).
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The Alternative Custody Program, with proper (i.e., gender-neutral enactment)
is arguably a socially advantageous approach to reducing prison overcrowding.
Instead of building new prisons, which would require more time and money, it
focuses on distributing benefits to all involved. Prisons will decrease their popula-
tions and this should, when coupled with other Realignment initiatives, help Cali-
fornia reduce prison overcapacity and come into compliance with the Supreme Court
order. With less money spent on incarceration, the State should have more tax dol-
lars to allocate to other social needs, benefitting the California community. And,
quite importantly, the program will benefit the inmates themselves, as they are pro-
vided with a structured and carefully monitored opportunity to reintegrate into their
families and communities, and rehabilitate themselves with local assistance.
